North Korea Sanctions

February 21, 2020: High-Risk Jurisdictions subject to a Call for Action

• "The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK’s failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK’s illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing."
• "The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/TF/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions."

March 5, 2019: Deceptive Shipping Practices Employed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

• "The Maritime Safety Committee, at its 100th session (3 to 7 December 2018), received a report of deceptive shipping practices employed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea intended to evade sanctions contained in relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. These deceptive shipping practices include disabling or manipulating ships' Automatic Identification Systems to mask the ships' full movement history; physically altering ships' names and IMO numbers in an attempt to obscure their identities and pass themselves off as different vessels; falsifying vessel and cargo documents to obscure the origin or destination of cargo; and transferring prohibited cargo at sea to conceal the origin or destination of prohibited crude oil, refined petroleum, and coal by creating the appearance of legitimate transfers."

March 1, 2018: North Korea: proliferation and compliance challenges

• Understand "geographic exposure to countries and trade hubs that are closest to North Korea. Regional trade hubs provide ideal operating environments for those seeking to evade sanctions, given the high volume of legitimate trade that illicit activity can hide in and their geographical proximity to North Korea."
• "DPRK uses extensive networks of front or ‘shell’ companies to mask its illicit activity. There is evidence that sectors as far-ranging as textiles and fisheries are often used as fronts, as well as the more widely-publicised coal exporters. These companies may not have an on-line presence – a potential red flag."

May 16, 2022: Guidance on the Democratic Republic of Korea Information Technology Workers

• The DPRK dispatches thousands of highly skilled IT workers around the world to generate revenue that contributes to its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs, in violation of U.S. and UN sanctions
• All DPRK IT workers earn money to support North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s regime. The vast majority of them are subordinate to and working on behalf of entities directly involved in the DPRK’s UN-prohibited WMD and ballistic missile programs, as well as its advanced conventional weapons development and trade sectors. This results in revenue generated by these DPRK IT workers being used by the DPRK to develop its WMD and ballistic programs, in violation of U.S. and UN sanctions. Many of these entities have been designated for sanctions by the UN and United States. 

September 1, 2020: North Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory

• "North Korea relies on foreign-sourced ballistic missile-related components that it cannot produce domestically. To obtain these components, North Korea uses an extensive overseas network of procurement agents, including officials who operate from North Korean diplomatic missions or trade offices, as well as third-country nationals and foreign companies."
• "North Korea also uses, and collaborates with foreign-incorporated companies, such as Chinese and Russian entities, to acquire foreign-sourced basic commercial components. These entities will purchase items and consolidate and repackage them for onward shipment to North Korea, concealing the true end-user from the manufacturers and distributors of the items. Moreover, procurement entities mislabel sensitive goods in export documentation, falsely declaring specialized materials to instead be general-purpose items that are widely commercially available."

May 14, 2020: Guidance to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasions Practices

• "This advisory discusses sanctions risks and contains information on common deceptive shipping practices and general approaches to aid in further tailoring due diligence and sanctions compliance policies and procedures. It is intended primarily to provide guidance to the following: ship owners, managers, operators, brokers, ship chandlers, flag registries, port operators, shipping companies, freight forwarders, classification service providers, commodity traders, insurance companies, and financial institutions."
• "This advisory includes both updated information on the deceptive practices used to evade sanctions and policies and procedures that entities operating in the specific maritime sectors enumerated above may wish to consider adopting as part of a risk-based sanctions compliance program."

April 15, 2020: Guidance on North Korea Cyber Threats

• "Under the pressure of robust U.S. and UN sanctions, the DPRK has increasingly relied on illicit activities – including cybercrime – to generate revenue for its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programs."
• "The DPRK has the capability to conduct disruptive or destructive cyber activities affecting U.S. critical infrastructure. The DPRK also uses cyber capabilities to steal from financial institutions, and has demonstrated a pattern of disruptive and harmful cyber activity that is wholly inconsistent with the growing international consensus on what constitutes responsible State behavior in cyberspace."

March 21, 2019: Updated Guidance on Addressing North Korea's Illicit Shipping Practices

• "Provides specific guidance for UN Member States and relevant industry actors on best practices to avoid engaging in North Korea-related illicit activities."
• List of vessels that are believed to have exported refined petroleum with North Korea or exported North Korean-origin coal.

July 23, 2018: Risks for Businesses with Supply Chain Links to North Korea

• "Multiple U.S. and UN sanctions impose restrictions on trade with North Korea and the use of North Korean labor. 1 The two primary risks are: (1) inadvertent sourcing of goods, services, or technology from North Korea; and (2) the presence of North Korean citizens or nationals in companies’ supply chains, whose labor generates revenue for the North Korean government. This advisory also provides due diligence references for businesses."

February 23, 2018: Sanctions Risks Related to North Korea's Shipping Practices

• "The North Korean shipping industry is a primary means by which North Korea evades sanctions to fund its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. As such, the United States will continue targeting persons, wherever located, who facilitate North Korea’s illicit shipping practices."
• The advisory provides an overview of UN and US sanctions relevant to the shipping industry and a list of North Korean vessels capable of engaging in ship-to-ship transfers.

February 23, 2018: North Korean Vessels

• Examples of deceptive North Korean shipping practices

November 2, 2017: Advisory on North Korea’s Use of the International Financial System

• Although international sanctions have significantly isolated North Korean banks, the North Korean government continues to use state-owned entities and banks, as well as bulk-cash smuggling and trade, to access the international financial system. Such access occurs through aliases, agents, and individuals in strategic jurisdictions, as well as through long-standing networks of front or shell companies and embassy personnel. North Korea’s illicit financial activity supports, among other things, its proliferation of WMD-related technology and missile systems as well as conventional weapons programs.

December 12, 2017: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s Use of the International Financial System for Money Laundering/Terrorist Financing

• North Korean entities and individuals have made use of front and shell companies in various jurisdictions to mask their involvement in the international financial system
• North Korean entities and individuals have been observed using particular jurisdictions from which to access the international financial system. While the jurisdictions discussed below are not an exhaustive list, transactions to or from these areas, in combination with other indicators, should be considered when deciding to report a suspicious transaction report

• Vessels transmitting falsified or inconsistent identifiers on Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) and reporting false destinations
• Vessels trading in restricted or banned commodities and exhibiting AIS transmission gaps while sailing in and around waters where illicit ship-to-ship activities typically occur
• Vessels are observed to lose their AIS signal while sailing
  towards DPRK waters and re-transmit once back in external waters
• Complicit actors falsify shipping documentation to conceal cargo’s origin or destination

• Continuing to use a country’s flag following removal from a registry, or flown a flag without proper authorization
• Some formerly foreign-flagged vessels have been reported to join the DPRK’s fleet

• Foreign-flagged tankers associated with illicit shipments to the DPRK have been observed operating outside of identified affected waters exhibiting uneconomical sailing behavior and AIS transmission gaps that suggest possible illicit ship-to-ship transfers or loading at ports

• Complicit actors have been known to not submit owner and management information on commercial maritime platforms or may be listed as undisclosed interests in the vessel’s onward sale
• Layered ownership and management structures, use of front companies and shell companies, and engaging multiple intermediaries removed from the actual owner
• Commercial relationships, linkages, or shared corporate secretary addresses between a vessel’s historical and current owners and / or managers, sometimes with DPRK-related shipping networks
• Vessels’ management companies manage(d) other vessels with similar risk profiles. Vessels’ registered owners may be incorporated in a variety of jurisdictions but typically list operational or businesses addresses in East Asia and in Southeast Asia. 

• Since May 2019, self-propelled barges of Chinese origin have been engaged in loading coal from Nampo and Taean, DPRK. These barges directly delivered to three ports in Hangzhou Bay, China. From May to August 2019, at least 540,000 tons of coal originating in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was delivered in 47 shipments. At least 37 different barges of Chinese origin were involved in exporting coal originating in the DPRK from May to September 2019.

• Areas of ship-to-ship transfers by DPRK tankers include East China Sea, Yellow Sea, and the Japan Sea
• Ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Tonkin have decreased substantially in favor of increased deliveries to the Ningbo-Zhoushan and Lianyungang port areas in China

• Transfer of coal originating in the DPRK from vessels sailing under that country’s flag to larger foreign-flagged bulk carriers for delivery, rather than to smaller, lighter vessels

• Vessels being acquired by new owners before transporting sanctioned cargo directly from the DPRK

• According to a Member State, a substantial sand-export operation from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to China has been carried out since May 2019, with over 100 illicit shipments of sand originating in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Chinese-flagged and other foreign-flagged vessels were reported to have been loading sand in or near Haeju, Hwanghae Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and in the Sinchang Workers’ District, Pukchong County, South Hamgyong Province, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. According to the Member State, these shipments involved at least one million tons of sand and were worth at least $22 million.

• Chinese fishing vessels displaying fishing permit number plates of the DPRK or with documents or interim certificates of registry of the DPRK

S/RES/2680

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 30, 2024

S/RES/2627

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 30, 2023

S/RES/2569

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 20, 2022

S/RES/2515 (2020)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 30, 2021

S/RES/2464 (2019)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 24, 2020

S/RES/2407 (2018)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 24, 2019

S/RES/2397 (2017)

• Strengthens the measures regarding the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of all refined petroleum products, including diesel and kerosene, with very specific preconditions and follow-up actions required by Member States, the 1718 Committee and the Committee Secretary. Reduces the allowed maximum aggregate amount for 12 months beginning on 1 January 2018 to 500,000 barrels (and twelve-month periods thereafter);
• Introduces a limit of 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons in the aggregate amount per a twelve-month period as of 22 December 2017 allowed for the supply, sale or transfer of crude oil by Member States to the DPRK. Member States are required to report the amount of crude oil provided to the DPRK to the 1718 Committee every 90 days;
• Expands sectoral sanctions by introducing a ban on DPRK’s export of food and agricultural products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone including magnesite and magnesia, wood and vessels. The resolution also prohibits the DPRK from selling or transferring fishing rights;
• Introduces a ban on the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK of all industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, iron, steel and other metals with the exception of spare parts to maintain DPRK commercial civilian passenger aircraft currently in use;
• Strengthens the ban on providing work authorizations for DPRK nationals by requiring Member States to repatriate all DRPK nationals earning income and all DPRK government safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad within their jurisdiction within 24 months from 22 December 2017. Member States are required to submit a midterm report after 15 months from 22 December and a final report after 27 months from 22 December to the Committee of all DPRK nationals that were repatriated based on this provision;
• Strengthens maritime measures to address the DPRK’s illicit exports of coal and other prohibited items as well as illicit imports of petroleum through deceptive maritime practices by requiring Member States to seize, inspect and freeze any vessel in their ports and territorial waters for involvement in prohibited activities. The provision ceases to apply if the Committee decides, on a case-by-case basis, after six months of impounding a vessel that adequate arrangements have been made to prevent future violations of the relevant resolutions;
• Strengthens vessel-related provisions by prohibiting the provision of insurance or re-insurance services to and requiring Member States to de-register any vessels involved in illicit activities. The resolution further prohibits Member States from providing classification services to such vessels and expands the ban on the supply, sale or transfer of vessels to the DPRK to also include used vessels;
• Decides that Member States should improve mutual information-sharing on suspected attempts by the DPRK to supply, sell, transfer or procure illicit cargo, and tasks the Committee, with the support of the Panel of Experts, to facilitate timely coordination. The resolution also introduces a requirement for Member States to notify the Committee of relevant identifying information as well as measures taken to carry out appropriate actions as authorized by the relevant provisions with regard to vessels in their territory or on the high seas designated as subject to the assets freeze, the port entry ban or other relevant measures;
• Clarifies that no provision in the resolution applies to the existing Russia-DPRK Rajin-Khasan port and rail project for solely exporting Russia-origin coal to other countries;
• Designates an additional 16 individuals and one entity.

S/RES/2375 (2017)

• Introduces a full ban on the supply, sale or transfer of all condensates and natural gas liquids to the DPRK;
• Introduces a limit for all refined petroleum products in terms of the amount allowed (for supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK) with very specific preconditions and follow-up action required by Member States, the 1718 Committee and the Committee Secretary;
• Introduces restrictions on the supply, sale or transfer of crude oil to the DPRK in any period of 12 months after the adoption of the resolution in the amount that is in excess of the amount Member States supplied in the period of 12 months prior to the adoption of the resolution (11 September 2017);
• Introduces a ban on the export by the DPRK of textiles (including fabrics and partially or fully completed apparel products);
• Introduces a ban on Member States from providing work authorizations for DPRK nationals, other than those for which written contracts have been finalized prior to the adoption of this resolution (11 September 2017);
• Expands financial sanctions by prohibiting all joint ventures or cooperative entities or expanding existing joint ventures  with DPRK entities or individuals;
• Directs the 1718 Committee to designate vessels transporting prohibited items from the DPRK;
• Introduces  further clarifications with regard to the call on Member States to inspect vessels with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contain prohibited items, including specific obligations of the flag State and Member State requirement to report to the Committee of non-cooperation by a flag State;
• Directs the 1718 Committee to designate additional WMD-related and conventional arms-related items;
• Designates one additional individual and three entities.

S/RES/2371 (2017)

• Introduces a full ban on coal, iron and iron ore, and adds lead and lead ore to the banned commodities subject to sectoral sanctions.
• Authorizes the 1718 Committee to designate vessels related to activities prohibited by relevant resolutions, and prohibits port calls by designated vessels and chartering of DPRK flagged vessels.
• Bans the hiring and paying of additional DPRK laborers used to generate foreign export earnings.
• Prohibits the export by the DPRK of seafood (including fish, crustaceans, mollusks and other aquatic invertebrates in all forms).
• Expands financial sanctions by prohibiting new or expanded joint ventures and cooperative commercial entities with the DPRK and clarifies that companies performing financial services are considered financial institutions for the purpose of implementing the relevant sanctions measures, and that paragraph 11 of resolution 2094 (2013) also applies to clearing funds through Member States’ territories.
• Prohibits the deployment and use of chemical weapons and calls for DPRK’s accession to the CWC.
• Directs the 1718 Committee to develop appropriate arrangements with INTERPOL to issue Special Notices.
• Directs the 1718 Committee to designate additional WMD-related and conventional arms-related items.
• Designates additional 9 individuals and 4 entities and provides updated information on 2 previously designated individuals.

S/RES/2356 (2017)

• Designates additional 14 individuals and 4 entities

S/RES/2345 (2017)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 24, 2018

S/RES/2321(2016)

• Expands arms embargo to the items listed in a new conventional arms dual-use list (which is to be adopted by the 1718 Committee).
• Expands cargo inspection by clarifying certain personal and/or checked baggage entering into or departing from the DPRK as “cargo” which is subject to inspection, and by noting that cargo being transported by rail and by road is also subject to inspection.
• Strengthens maritime transport related provisions by prohibiting the following activities: all leasing, chartering or provision of crew services to the DPRK; registering vessels in the DPRK; obtaining authorization for a vessel to use the DPRK’s flag; owning, leasing, operating, providing any vessel classification, certification or associated service or insuring any vessel flagged by the DPRK. Additionally, prohibits the provision of insurance or re-insurance services to vessels owned, controlled or operated by the DPRK. Exemptions are available if approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.
• Introduces procedures to designate vessels based on reasonable grounds that the vessels are or have been related to prohibited programs or activities.
• Prohibits the supply, sale or transfer to the DPRK new helicopters and vessels (except as approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis).
• Overhauls and expands sectoral sanctions by placing an annual cap on the amount/value of coal exports by the DPRK and introducing a real-time system on reporting and monitoring these exports.  Adds copper, nickel, silver and zinc to the materials banned from supplying, selling or transferring by the DPRK and prohibits their procurement and/or transfer by Member States Calls on Member States to provide no more fuel to DPRK-flagged civil passenger aircraft than necessary (for the relevant flight) and includes a standard margin for safety of flight.
• Adds new items to the luxury goods ban.
• Strengthens the proliferation network related measures by requiring Member States to reduce the number of staff at DPRK diplomatic missions and consular posts and limit the number of bank accounts to one per DPRK diplomatic mission or consular posts and one per DPRK diplomat and consular officer. Imposes entry and transit restrictions for DPRK government officials, members of the DPRK armed forces, or members/officials which are associated with prohibited programs or activities. Bans any use of real property in Member States’ territories for purposes other than diplomatic or consular activities. Strengthens financial measures, including by requesting closure of existing representative offices, subsidiaries or banking accounts in the DPRK within ninety days; prohibiting public and private financial support for trade with the DPRK; expelling individuals who are believed to be working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial institution; Exemptions are available if approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis.
• Clarifies the restrictions on specialized teaching and training to include but is not limited to advanced materials science, advanced chemical engineering, advanced mechanical engineering, advanced electrical engineering and advanced industrial engineering.
• Requires the suspension of scientific and technical cooperation with exemption procedures requiring Committee approval and notification in certain areas respectively.
• Prohibits the DPRK from supplying, selling or transferring statues and Member States from procuring such items (unless approved in advance by the Committee on a case-by-case basis).
• Designates additional 11 individuals and 10 entities.

S/RES/2276 (2016)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 24, 2017.

S/RES/2270(2016)

• Expands arms embargo and non-proliferation measures, including small arms and light weapons, catch-all provisions to ban any item if related to prohibited programs, dual-use nuclear/missile items, and operational capabilities of DPRK’s and another Member States’ armed forces.
• Enforces new cargo inspection and maritime procedures, including mandatory inspection on cargo destined to and originating from the DPRK; ban on DPRK chartering of vessels and aircraft; ban on operating DPRK vessels or using DPRK flags; ban on flights (of any plane) or port calls (of any vessel) if related to prohibited items, prohibited activities, and designated persons or entities.
• Expands financial measures, including an assets freeze on Government of the DPRK and its Workers’ Party entities associated with prohibited programmes and activities; clarifies that assets freeze includes vessels; prohibits DPRK banks from opening new branches; requires States to close existing DPRK bank branches in their territories; prohibits Member States from opening branches in the DPRK; requires States to close existing offices in the DPRK if related to prohibited programmes or sanctions violations.
• Enforces sectoral sanctions (coal, minerals and fuel ban) and prohibits its procurement and/or transfer by Member States. Adds new items to the luxury goods ban.
• Clarifies ban on hosting of DPRK trainers, advisors or other officials for police, paramilitary and military training; Ban on specialized training or teaching for DPRK nationals in specific fields that could contribute to the DPRK’s proliferation-sensitive activities.
• Requires Member States to expel DPRK diplomats and foreign nationals involved in illicit activities.
• Designates additional 16 individuals and 12 entities.
• OMM vessels are subject to the assets freeze. Of the 31 vessels listed in Annex III of resolution 2270 (2016), 4 were removed by the Committee by its decision of 21 March 2016 (Security Council press release SC/12296) and an additional 5 were removed by the Committee by its decision of 17 December 2016 (Security Council press release SC/12636.

S/RES/2207 (2015)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 5, 2016.

S/RES/2141 (2014)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until April 5, 2015.

S/RES/2094 (2013)

• Imposes targeted financial sanctions; expands the prohibited items list concerning nuclear, ballistic missile and other WMD related items; Provides a non-exhaustive list of prohibited luxury goods.
• Designates three additional individuals and 2 additional entities; expands designations criteria to include individuals and entities that have contributed to the DPRK’s prohibited programs.
• Increases the Panel of Experts to eight members; extends its mandate until 7 April 2014.

S/RES/2087 (2013)

• Expands measures related to Member States’ rights to seize and destroy material suspected of being connected to the DPRK’s weapons development or research; expands measures imposed on persons suspected of involvement with the DPRK’s nuclear program. Clarifies methods of material disposal.
• Clarifies measures related to the catch-all provision.
• Designates four individuals and 6 entities; expands designation criteria to include entities/individuals that have assisted in the evasion of sanctions or in violation of the resolutions.

S/RES/2050 (2012)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until July 12, 2013.

S/RES/1985 (2011)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until June 12, 2012

S/RES/1928 (2010)

• Extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts until June 12, 2011

S/RES/1874 (2009)

• Expands measures related to arms’ exports and imports to all arms and related material (except import of small arms and light weapons and their related materiel)
• Calls upon Member States to prevent provision of financial services or transfer of financial resources that could contribute to prohibited programs/activities. States to report on inspections, seizures and disposals, as well as the sale, supply or transfer of small arms or light weapons, among others.
• Establishes the Panel of Experts to assist the 1718 Committee 

S/RES/1718 (2006)

• Establishes Security Council Sanctions Committee (1718 Committee)
• Imposes an arms embargo, assets freeze and travel ban on persons involved in the DPRK’s nuclear program, and a ban on a range of imports and exports, to prohibit the DPRK from conducting nuclear tests or launching ballistic missiles